Extremist violence in the Middle East, Africa and beyond is often explained through politics, poverty, foreign intervention or regional grievance. Those factors can matter. But the founding documents and propaganda of several major Islamist militant groups show another element that cannot be ignored: the groups themselves frequently use religious arguments to justify killing.
That does not mean their interpretations represent Islam as practiced by most Muslims. Researchers cited in the source material describe many of these uses as selective, decontextualized and geared toward militant rulings rather than mainstream exegesis. Still, the documents matter because they reveal how the groups explain their own violence to recruits, followers and enemies.
## Al-Qaeda’s Fatwa Framed Killing Americans as a Duty
Al-Qaeda’s 1998 statement, issued under Osama bin Laden’s name as the “World Islamic Front Statement,” invoked Quranic verses to support a call for violence against the United States. The statement concluded that killing Americans, both civilians and military personnel, was an “individual duty for every Muslim,” according to the source text.
The ideological chain behind that claim is commonly traced through earlier religious and political thinkers. The source points to Ibn Taymiyyah, the 14th-century jurist whose rulings about Muslim rulers who failed to govern by sharia later became important to modern takfiri movements. It also cites Sayyid Qutb, the 20th-century Islamist thinker whose writings described modern society — including some Muslim governments — as having fallen into jahiliyyah, or pre-Islamic ignorance.
Ayman al-Zawahiri later advanced related arguments in a work known as “Exoneration,” according to the source. That text reportedly sought to justify broader attacks and relied on other jihadist authorities to answer questions about Zawahiri’s standing to issue religious rulings.
## ISIS Propaganda Quoted Scripture Selectively
The Islamic State also leaned heavily on religious language, including apocalyptic themes. Its English-language magazines, Dabiq and Rumiyah, were named for end-times references: Dabiq is a town in northern Syria associated in some traditions with a final battle, while Rumiyah means Rome.
Academic studies cited in the source found that ISIS propaganda quoted only a small share of the Quran, while repeatedly emphasizing violent fragments. Researchers described the pattern as cherry-picking rather than representative Quranic interpretation.
One corpus study of the first 14 issues of Dabiq found that three-quarters of the 624 verses quoted or referenced appeared only once or twice. Another analysis of Dabiq and Rumiyah found that the most-cited verses served two main purposes: defining loyalty to the jihadist group and justifying violence against those cast outside that circle, including other Muslims.
ISIS also used religious arguments to justify atrocities against minorities. Its 2014 ultimatum to Christians in Iraq demanded conversion, payment of jizya or death. In Dabiq Issue 4, an essay titled “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour” argued that Yazidis could be enslaved under classical jurisprudence. Lawfare’s analysis, cited in the source, says ISIS treated that position as settled law.
## Hamas’s 1988 Charter Used Religious Claims Against Jews
Hamas’s original 1988 charter made explicit religious claims about its conflict with Israel. Article Seven quoted a hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and recorded in the collections of Bukhari and Muslim describing a future battle in which Muslims kill Jews.
The charter also cited Quran 2:120 to frame reconciliation with non-Muslims as betrayal, according to the source, and declared: “Allah is its goal, the Prophet its model, the Quran its Constitution, Jihad its path.”
The source material does not address later Hamas political documents or internal debates over whether the 1988 charter remains the group’s operative framework. Human editors should verify and contextualize that point before publication.
## Boko Haram’s Takfir Doctrine Turned on Other Muslims
Boko Haram’s ideology also draws on takfir — the practice of declaring other self-identified Muslims to be unbelievers. The source states that founder Mohammed Yusuf built the group’s original mosque, the Ibn Taimiyyah Masjid, around a framework linked to Ibn Taymiyyah.
Under Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram expanded that doctrine dramatically. The source says Shekau treated voting, holding government identification or sending children to secular schools as grounds for branding Muslims unbelievers and killing them.
That hard-line approach became so extreme that even ISIS leadership reportedly rejected it. In 2016, ISIS removed Shekau and backed Abu Musab al-Barnawi as leader of its West African faction, ISWAP. According to the source, ISWAP rejected Shekau’s broad application of takfir against ordinary civilians, Muslims and even fellow commanders.
The dispute was not over whether takfir could be used at all, but over how widely it could be applied.
## Iran’s IRGC and Hezbollah Rely on a Different Theological Framework
The source also discusses Shia Islamist movements, especially Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah.
The IRGC is rooted in Iran’s post-1979 doctrine of wilayat al-faqih, or guardianship of the Islamic jurist, developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Under that system, a senior cleric holds supreme religious and political authority during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, a central belief in Twelver Shia Islam.
The source cites Middle East Forum for the claim that the IRGC’s hostility to Israel is tied to Mahdism, including the belief that removing obstacles to the Twelfth Imam’s return is a religious obligation. That claim should be independently checked and attributed carefully because it concerns interpretation of state and militia doctrine.
Hezbollah’s 1985 Open Letter pledged obedience to the faqih as ultimate religious and political authority. The source says the group was formed in 1982 with direct organizational and doctrinal support from an IRGC delegation to Lebanon. Hezbollah frames armed struggle against Israel as jihad and, when Muslim land is deemed occupied, as fard ayn — an individual obligation.
## The Hard Question for Peace Efforts
None of this proves that religion alone causes terrorism. Political grievances, wars, state repression, foreign policy and local power struggles all shape militant movements. Nor do these groups’ interpretations represent the beliefs of most Muslims.
But the documents cited here show that major Islamist militant organizations do not merely use religion as decoration. They often present violence as a religious duty, define enemies through theological categories and appeal to clerics, scripture or jurisprudence to recruit and justify action.
That creates a challenge for policymakers and peace negotiators. If a movement frames war not only as strategy but as divine obligation, concessions alone may not resolve the conflict. Any serious analysis has to account for both the political battlefield and the ideological one.
